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Abstract  
A growing literature suggests that generalized distrust mindsets encourage carefully 
considering alternatives—yet it remains unclear whether this pertains to moral decision-
making. We propose that distrust simultaneously increases opposing moral response 
inclinations when moral decisions pit two moral responses against one another, such as 
classic moral dilemmas where causing harm maximizes outcomes. Such a pattern may be 
invisible to conventional analytic techniques that treat dilemma response inclinations as 
diametric opposites. Therefore, we employed process dissociation to independently assess 
response inclinations underlying moral dilemma responses. Three studies demonstrated that 
activating generalized distrust (vs. trust and control) mindsets increased both harm avoidance 
and outcome-maximization response tendencies. These effects canceled out for conventional 
relative dilemma judgments. Moreover, perceptions of feeling torn between available 
response options mediated the impact of distrust on both response inclinations. These 
findings clarify how distrust impacts decision-making processes in the moral domain.  
 
Keywords: trust, distrust, moral judgment, dilemmas, process dissociation 
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Distrusting Your Moral Compass:  
The Impact of Distrust Mindsets on Moral Dilemma Processing and Judgments 
 
“Mistrust first impulses; they are nearly always good.” 
―Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, Diplomat (1754-1838) 
“The people I distrust most are those who want to improve our lives but have only 
one course of action.”       
―Frank Herbert, Novelist (1920-1986) 
 
A host of research suggests that distrust can operate as a generalized mindset that 
shakes people out of default information processing by increasing the salience of relevant 
alternative possibilities (e.g., Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2004). Such work has intriguing, yet 
unexplored, implications for moral psychology, and moral decision-making in particular: 
when considering classic moral dilemmas where causing harm maximizes outcomes, such as 
harming research animals to cure AIDS, distrust may increase people’s desire to both 
response options. Yet, when deliberating between clearly moral response options (e.g., 
refusing to harm research animals) versus more self-interested options (e.g., harming animals 
to improve beauty products), distrust might reduce people’s tendency to make moral 
decisions by highlighting the tempting non-moral alternative. Hence, inducing generalized 
distrust might either increase or reduce moral response inclinations depending on which 
response alternatives people consider. We present three studies demonstrating this 
phenomenon, exploring how distrust alters moral decision-making processes.  
Trust/Distrust Mindsets  
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Although trust and distrust sometimes pertain to specific targets, they may also 
operate as generalized mindsets that influence whatever decisions are currently under 
consideration (Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2004). A host of research indicates that trust 
mindsets signal that all is well with the world, so careful processing is unnecessary; one may 
uncritically rely on routine processing to get by. Trust indicates that situations, people, and 
appearances can be taken at face value, as their hidden features match their surface 
properties. Conversely, distrust mindsets signal that something is amiss in the environment 
and it therefore warrants close scrutiny; one should carefully consider alternatives to one’s 
initial conclusions (e.g., Kleiman et al., 2015; Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011; Mayo, Alfasi, & 
Schwarz, 2014; Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2004; Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2008). 
Accordingly, distrust alters information encoding and processing to help resolve 
suspicious situations and avoid being misled: generalized distrust mindsets are characterized 
by questioning ones’ default position and engaging in non-routine information processing 
(Schul et al., 2008; Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011; Posten & Mussweiler, 2013). Specifically, 
people in a distrust mindset tend to apply multiple interpretive frames to a given situation or 
set of information—that is, they consider events from multiple perspectives—and to refrain 
from inferring dispositions from behaviors (Fein, 1996). For example, under distrust, people 
encode messages as both true and false (Schul, Burnstein, & Bardi, 1996), apply multiple 
information categories (Friesen & Sinclair, 2011), remain vigilant for unusual contingencies 
(Schul et al., 2008), apply more flexible and creative problem-solving strategies (Mayer & 
Mussweiler, 2011), reduce reliance on stereotypes in favor of individuating information 
(Posten & Mussweiler, 2013), and engage in more disconfirmatory hypothesis testing (Mayo, 
Alfasi, & Schwarz, 2014). Moreover, stimuli encountered under distrust activate incongruent 
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associations—for example, black activates white and hollow activates full (e.g., Schul et al., 
2004). Furthermore, distrust has been shown to block accessibility effects in several domains, 
such as person perception (Kleiman et al., 2015). Generalized trust and distrust mindsets 
hence alter processing strategies applied to information unrelated to the initial distrust-
eliciting stimulus (e.g., Schul et al., 2004). In sum, whereas generalized trust mindsets entail 
routine information processing and uncritically accepting default positions, distrust mindsets 
promote questioning one’s default and considering alternative responses and interpretations. 
Therefore, when faced with a difficult choice as in moral dilemmas, people in a distrust 
mindset should feel more torn between whatever response options are available. Considering 
one possible response should activate the opposing response as well (Kleiman et al., 2015).1  
Distrust mindsets can be activated by providing subtle cues hinting that people may 
have ulterior motives or that objects may be unreliable. Researchers have employed a variety 
of methods to do so, including activating semantic concepts related to distrust, confronting 
participants with untrustworthy social targets, or asking participants to recall experiences of 
distrust (e.g., Kleiman et al, 2015; Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011). Such manipulations are 
typically contrasted against manipulations designed to activate generalized trust mindsets, 
which hint that objects and situations are reliable or that people may have honest and 
forthright motives, or neutral conditions that involve processing ordinary information. When 
people encounter morally-relevant decisions, we hypothesized that inducing distrust may 
jostle people out of making their default decision by inducing them to fully consider the 
alternative response, thereby ratcheting up their desire to select both response options (i.e., 
decisional ambivalence). Whereas such an effect may be invisible to classic dilemma analytic 
techniques, it may nonetheless be detectable via process dissociation.  
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Moral Dilemmas 
Philosophers originally developed moral dilemmas to contrast two responses that 
correspond to philosophical positions (Foot, 1967). In classic dilemmas, causing harm 
maximizes overall outcomes, such as the dilemma where testing harmful chemicals on 
animals helps to cure AIDS. Deontological ethical positions entail rejecting harm, because 
they define morality by the intrinsic nature of an action: harm violates individuals and is 
therefore immoral regardless of what good it might achieve (Kant, 1875/1959). Conversely, 
utilitarian ethical positions entail accepting harm to maximize outcomes, because they define 
morality by the consequences of actions: actions that maximize net outcomes (utility) are 
moral even if they involve causing harm (Mill, 1861/1998). Accordingly, some theorists have 
referred to harm rejection as the ‘characteristically deontological’ judgment, and harm 
acceptance as the ‘characteristically utilitarian’ judgment (e.g., Greene et al., 2001). Note that 
this does not mean that judgments were caused by the philosophies in question; rather they 
are consistent with those philosophies. Hence, referring to such judgments as ‘utilitarian’ or 
‘deontological’ can be problematic (see Kahane, 2015); nonetheless we retain this 
terminology in order to maximize consistency with past work.  
The most prominent model of moral dilemma responses is the dual-process model of 
moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001; c.f., Mikhail, 2007), which postulates that moral 
dilemma responses stem from the competition between two psychological processes: an 
affect-laden aversion to causing harm, which motivates harm rejection (despite the lives lost), 
and a cognitive evaluation of outcomes, which motivates harm acceptance (in order to save 
lives). Although the original conceptualization suggested that affective responses precede 
cognitive ones in processing (Greene et al., 2001), reaction time data supporting this 
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conception has been withdrawn (Greene et al., 2004) and recent findings suggest that each 
response tendency requires a similar amount of time to process (e.g., Baron & Gürçay, 2016). 
Therefore, the dual-process model is better conceptualized as a competition between 
relatively affect-laden tendencies to reject harm and relatively cognitive tendencies to accept 
harm to maximize outcomes that require similar processing time. Although experimental 
manipulations certainly influence responses (e.g., Amit & Greene, 2012), people typically 
prefer one or the other response by default (Helzer et al., 2016), and stable individual 
differences reliably predict dilemma judgments (e.g., Bartels, 2008). Thus, not all people 
may experience strong conflict when encountering dilemmas; many may simply select their 
default dilemma choice unless they have reason to carefully consider the alternative.  
Typically, moral dilemma researchers confine investigation only to classic dilemmas 
where causing harm maximizes outcomes. Although such studies generally support the dual-
process model, they suffer from an important methodological limitation: they treat 
deontological and utilitarian judgments as perfect opposites. Participants must either endorse 
or reject causing outcome-maximizing harm, such that higher scores reflect relatively more 
endorsement of utilitarian responses and lower scores reflect relatively more endorsement of 
deontological responses. Thus, the measurement of deontology and utilitarianism is not 
independent. Yet, the model posits two independent processes that jointly contribute to 
conventional relative judgments (Greene et al., 2001). Using classic methods, any factor that 
simultaneously increases both response tendencies would cancel out, much like adding 
weight evenly to both sides of a scale retains its balance even as the absolute amount of 
weight changes. Accordingly, two people may select the same conventional dilemma 
response for very different reasons. One might feel strong inclinations to select both 
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responses, and consequently feel torn between them, before ultimately selecting only one. 
Another might feel weak inclinations to select either option, and consequently not feel torn 
between them, yet arrive at the same judgment. Conventional classic dilemmas can hence not 
distinguish between these possibilities due to the non-independent measurement of 
deontological and utilitarian responses.  
Other predictions are also possible. First, if generalized distrust operates similar to 
personal distrust, distrust manipulations may undermine confidence in evidence (e.g., Darke 
& Ritchie, 2007; Schul & Peri, 2015). In this case, evidence pertains to the dilemma 
information provided by researchers. Distrust in evidence may result in participants doubting 
that actions will cause harm, or doubting that actions will succeed in causing beneficial 
actions. Either way, sowing such distrust ought to reduce one or both response tendencies: if 
actions will not cause harm, there is no need to avoid them, if actions will not improve the 
world, there is no need to perform them. Second, insofar as the distrust items are more 
negative than the trust items, they may induce negative emotion or a general negativity bias. 
Past work suggests negative emotions selectively increase deontological responding (e.g., 
Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006), as deontological responses are tied more directly to emotional 
concern for others (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Alternatively, general negativity may lead 
to a general increase in harm acceptance, which would translate into reductions on both 
parameters. Hence, this prediction would suggest that distrust mindsets should either 
selectively increase deontological inclinations, or should decrease both deontological and 
utilitarian inclinations. The current work has potential to distinguish between these 
possibilities and our focal prediction that distrust will increase both deontological and 
utilitarian response tendencies.    
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Process Dissociation 
To overcome the non-independent measurement of deontology and utilitarianism 
endemic to conventional dilemma measures, Conway and Gawronski (2013) adapted a 
technique called process dissociation (Jacoby, 1991) to independently assess deontological 
and utilitarian response inclinations underpinning conventional dilemma judgments. Process 
dissociation is a widely-applied content-agnostic procedure for distinguishing the 
independent contributions of multiple processes theorized to jointly contribute to 
dichotomous judgments (Payne & Bishara, 2009). The key insight was to measure responses 
on both trials that pit the two underlying processes against one another (incongruent trials) as 
well as trials where the two underlying processes lead to the same response (congruent 
trials).  
Conway and Gawronski (2013) developed a new battery composed of both 
incongruent and congruent moral dilemmas. Incongruent dilemmas corresponded to classic, 
conventional, high-conflict dilemmas because causing harm maximizes overall outcomes 
(see Koenigs et al., 2007)—hence, deontological and utilitarian responses are incongruent. 
Congruent dilemmas are worded identically to their incongruent counterparts, except that the 
outcome of harm is reduced, such that causing harm no longer maximizes overall outcomes. 
For such dilemmas, rejecting harm is consistent with both deontology and utilitarianism—
that is, these inclinations are congruent. However, people may accept causing harm on 
congruent dilemmas for other (non-moral) reasons, such as self-interest, vengeance, or 
sadism. By applying response patterns to both kinds of dilemmas to a decision tree, the 
unique component of each process can be derived mathematically (see Figure 1), and 
researchers can derive two parameters: one tapping ‘deontological’ inclinations to 
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consistently reject harm, and the other taping ‘utilitarian’ inclinations to consistently 
maximize outcomes.  
A growing body of work supports the utility of the process dissociation approach. 
Empirically, these parameters are largely uncorrelated, yet both correlate sensibly with 
conventional relative judgments: people higher on the utilitarian parameter tend to make 
more utilitarian versus deontological conventional judgments, whereas people higher on the 
deontological parameter tend to make more deontological than utilitarian conventional 
judgments. Friesdorf, Conway, and Gawronski (2015) confirmed this pattern meta-
analytically across 40 datasets. In line with the dual-process model, the deontological 
parameter appears to tap primarily processes related to affective reactions to harm, whereas 
the utilitarian parameter appears to tap primarily cognitive processes related to cost-benefit 
calculations, as manipulations can impact them individually and they have different impacts 
on related variables (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Park, Kappes, Van Bavel, & Rho, 2016; 
Lee & Gino, 2015).  
However, for present purposes the distinction between affective and cognitive 
processing is less important than the fact that the parameters vary independently. As a result, 
some constructs may increase both parameters simultaneously. For example, Conway and 
Gawronski (2013) found that moral identity—the degree to which morality is central to the 
self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002)—predicted both the deontological and utilitarian 
parameters. These positive relations cancelled out for conventional dilemma judgments when 
deontological inclinations were pitted directly against utilitarian ones. We anticipated 
obtaining a similar effect for distrust: by jostling people out of their default judgment 
preference and inducing them to more carefully consider the alternative response, and then in 
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turn reconsider their initial response, distrust should increase both parameters. However, this 
simultaneous increase should cancel out for conventional judgments. We also expected an 
opposite effect for trust mindset manipulations: we anticipated that inducing a generalized 
trust mindset might lull participants into increased security in their initial preference, leading 
to a reduction in both parameters as participants need not scrutinize either response carefully 
in order to complete the dilemma task. They could simply select one without considering the 
other (with some people uncritically selecting one answer and other people uncritically 
selecting the other answer, leading to a lower net level of either answer compared to the 
distrust condition where people ratchet up their desire to select both by vacillating between 
them. Moreover, we expected a neutral condition to emulate the trust condition, based on 
work suggesting that trust mindsets operate as the default (e.g., Mayo, 2015; Schul et al., 
2004). Calculating the deontology and utilitarian PD parameters requires examining harm 
acceptance and rejection judgments for both congruent and incongruent dilemmas. As 
harmful action maximizes outcomes in incongruent but not congruent dilemmas, accepting 
harm on incongruent dilemmas but rejecting harm on congruent dilemmas upholds 
utilitarianism. Conversely, deontology entails avoiding causing harm, so rejecting harm 
always upholds deontology. We illustrate this point in Figure 1: the top path illustrates the 
case where utilitarianism drives dilemma judgments—accepting harm for incongruent and 
harm for congruent dilemmas. The second path illustrates the case where deontology drives 
dilemma judgments—thus always rejecting harm. The bottom path presents the case where 
neither utilitarianism nor deontology drives dilemma responses, such that causing harm is 
acceptable because people have neither utilitarian nor deontological reasons to avoid it.   
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By reviewing the two rightmost columns in Figure 1, researchers can derive which 
cases led participants to reject or accept harm for congruent and incongruent dilemmas. For 
congruent dilemmas, harm rejection occurs either when utilitarianism drives responses: U, or 
when deontology drives responses: (1 – U) × D. Conversely, harm acceptance for congruent 
dilemmas occurs when neither utilitarianism nor deontology drives responses: (1 – U) × (1 – 
D). For incongruent dilemmas, harm rejection occurs when deontology drives responses: (1 – 
U) × D. Conversely, harm acceptance occurs when either utilitarianism drives responses: U, 
or when neither utilitarianism nor deontology drives responses: (1 – U) × (1 – D).  
By mathematically representing the probability of each case and plugging in each 
participants’ decisions, researchers can combine and rearrange equations to algebraically 
solve for the two unknown parameters (D and U) for each participant. For example, the 
probability of rejecting harm on congruent dilemmas involves either the case where 
utilitarianism drives responses, or deontology drives responses:  
Eq. (1) p(unacceptable | congruent) = U + [(1 – U) × D] 
Conversely, the probability of accepting harm for congruent dilemmas involves the 
case when neither utilitarianism nor deontology drives responses: 
Eq. (2) p(acceptable | congruent) = (1 – U) × (1 – D) 
For incongruent dilemmas, the probability of rejecting harm occurs when deontology 
drives responses:  
Eq. (3) p(unacceptable | incongruent) = (1 – U) × D 
Conversely, the probability of rejecting harm occurs when either utilitarianism drives 
responses, or neither deontology nor utilitarianism drives responses:  
Eq. (4) p(acceptable | incongruent) = U + [(1 – U) × (1 – D)] 
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By representing all probabilities algebraically for congruent and incongruent 
dilemmas, researchers can plug in each participants’ pattern of actual responses and 
algebraically combine these equations to solve for two parameters estimating deontological 
(D) and utilitarian (U) inclinations underpinning their responses. Specifically, by combining 
Equations 3 and 1, researchers can solve for U:  
Eq. (5) U = p(unacceptable | congruent) - p(unacceptable | incongruent) 
Once U has been obtained, researchers can plug in this value to Equation 3 to solve 
for D thus:    
Eq. (6) D = p(unacceptable | incongruent) / (1 – U) 
Together, these formulas enable researchers to derive two parameters that 
independently estimate the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations underlying 
conventional relative dilemma judgments (see Conway & Gawronski, 2013, for details). 2  
Hypotheses and Overview of Current Work 
In light of existing evidence demonstrating that generalized distrust increases 
consideration of alternatives and non-routine processing, we anticipated that activating 
distrust (versus trust) mindsets will jostle people out of their default dilemma response 
strategy by inducing them to carefully consider the alternative response. Due to the specific 
information-processing strategies induced by distrust, distrustful participants should be 
inclined to select both responses—that is, demonstrate increases in both the deontological 
and utilitarian process dissociation parameters underpinning conventional dilemma 
judgments. These simultaneous increases should cancel out for conventional relative 
dilemma judgments that pit deontology directly against utilitarianism. Moreover, considering 
and contrasting both response options should increase experienced conflict during dilemma 
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decision-making. Thus, we expect that perceptions of feeling torn (i.e., ambivalent) between 
available dilemma response options would mediate the effect of distrust on dilemma 
processing. Conversely, we anticipated that inducing generalized trust would lull participants 
into heuristically and uncritically relying on whichever initial impulse they typically prefer, 
rather than ambivalently considering both responses. We also anticipated that a neutral 
condition would emulate the trust condition. We report three studies investigating these 
predictions, and provide a meta-analysis including three additional file-drawer studies (see 
Supplementary Material). We report all exclusions, independent and dependent variables, 
sample size and data-stopping decisions for all studies. Data and analyses for all studies are 
available at osf.io/25mhq.  
Study 1 
In Study 1 we activated either trust or distrust mindsets via a scrambled-sentences 
task adapted from previous work (e.g., Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011). Participants in the trust-
mindset condition unscrambled sentences describing trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, 
etc., whereas those in the distrust-mindset condition unscrambled sentences regarding 
untrustworthiness, dishonesty, unreliability, etc. In between unscrambling sentences, 
participants completed the moral dilemma battery from Conway and Gawronski (2013). This 
battery allows for assessing conventional deontological versus utilitarian dilemma judgments, 
consistent with standard practice (e.g., Greene et al, 2001). However, this battery also allows 
for calculating independent estimates of the deontological and utilitarian inclinations 
underpinning participants’ dilemma judgments. We examined how trust versus distrust 
mindsets impacted both conventional judgments and each parameter. We predicted that 
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activating generalized distrust (relative to trust) would increase both parameters, but that 
conventional judgments would remain unaffected.  
Method 
Participants. We recruited 89 American participants (36 female, 53 male, Mage = 
33.09, SD = 10.83) for payment via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Amazon, 2015). A recent 
meta-analysis on the process dissociation of moral dilemmas found no differences between 
Mechanical Turk and laboratory samples (Friesdorf et al., 2015; see also Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). We aimed for approximately 50 participants per cell (see 
Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), but ended up with slightly fewer. A post-hoc power 
analysis using GPower indicated this sample provided ~87% power to detect the main effect 
of mindset across both parameters (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Data were 
collected in a single run. There were no exclusions.  
Procedure. Participants completed all measures online. First, they read instructions 
pertaining to the scrambled-sentences task as well as the dilemma task, and were told the 
tasks were interspersed. Then participants unscrambled 10 sentences (5 experimental, 5 
control) before encountering the first moral dilemma. Thereafter, participants unscrambled 
two sentences (1 experimental, 1 control, in a fixed randomized order) in between answering 
each of 20 moral dilemmas. This procedure allowed for repeatedly re-activating concepts 
related to trust/distrust, while the true purpose of the manipulation was masked by filler 
sentences.  
Scrambled-sentences task. We adapted the scrambled-sentences task from past work 
on this topic (Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011; Posten & Mussweiler, 2013). For each scrambled 
sentence, participants were presented with five words in a random order (all capitalized) and 
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were asked to enter a valid four-word sentence into a text box (as one word was always 
irrelevant). For example, COOKIES HAT SOME THEY BAKE could be unscrambled as They 
bake some cookies. Participants in the trust-mindset condition unscrambled 24 sentences 
regarding trustworthiness, honesty, and reliability (e.g., The car starts reliably; Her story 
was believable). Participants in the distrust-mindset condition unscrambled 24 sentences 
regarding untrustworthiness, dishonesty, and unreliability (e.g., He asked misleading 
questions; The path seems uncertain). Scrambled sentences from all studies are available in 
Appendix A. We interspersed the priming sentences in each condition with 24 neutral 
sentences (e.g., It is sunny today; They saw her walking) to mask the goal of the 
manipulation. This mask appeared effective: only two participants identified a theme of trust 
or distrust in open-ended responses, and one additional person who identified the purpose of 
the study. Results remain similar when excluding them.3  
Moral dilemma task. Next, participants completed 10 moral dilemmas, each with one 
congruent and one incongruent version, in the same fixed random order as in Conway and 
Gawronski (2013). Incongruent dilemmas correspond to high-conflict (Koenigs et al., 2007) 
moral dilemmas where causing harm leads to the best overall outcome. For example, in the 
incongruent crying baby dilemma, participants must decide whether it is acceptable to kill an 
infant to prevent its cries from attracting murderous soldiers who would kill all the 
townsfolk. Such dilemmas are said to pit deontological against utilitarian ethical 
considerations (Foot, 1967). Congruent dilemmas employ similar wording to incongruent 
dilemmas, except the outcome of causing harm is reduced such that causing harm no longer 
leads to the best overall outcome. For example, in the congruent crying baby dilemma, 
participants must decide whether it is acceptable to kill an infant to prevent its cries from 
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attracting soldiers who will merely cause the townsfolk to labor in a mine. As causing harm 
no longer leads to the best overall outcome, deontological and utilitarian ethical positions are 
no longer in conflict—harm rejection is consistent with both deontology and utilitarianism. 
Note, however, that people may still accept causing harm for other reasons (e.g., pragmatism, 
selfishness, vengeance, etc.).  
For each dilemma, participants indicated whether causing harm is appropriate or not 
appropriate (see Greene et al., 2001). For example, is it appropriate to kill the baby to save 
the other townsfolk? Conventional dilemma analyses examine only responses to incongruent 
dilemmas, where the proportion of times participants indicate that causing harm is acceptable 
corresponds to conventional utilitarian versus deontological judgments, and the inverse 
proportion (where participants indicated that causing harm is unacceptable) corresponds to 
conventional deontological versus utilitarian judgments. As these figures are the inverse of 
one another, we present only the findings for judging harm as relatively acceptable (i.e., 
relatively more utilitarian versus deontological judgments). Process dissociation allows for 
the analysis of not only conventional relative moral dilemma judgments, but also two 
independent parameters reflecting the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations: 
the deontology and utilitarian parameters. We followed the six steps required to calculate the 
parameters as described by Conway and Gawronski (described above).  
Results  
Conventional dilemma analysis. First, we examined whether participants in the trust 
or distrust mindset conditions were more likely to accept causing harm on conventional, 
incongruent, high-conflict moral dilemmas where harm maximizes outcomes. As predicted, 
no significant differences emerged between the distrust (M = .60, SD = .19) and trust (M = 
DISTRUST AND MORAL JUDGMENT  18 
  
.62, SD = .21) conditions, t(87) = -0.35, p = .725, 95% CIdiff [-.10, .07], and the effect size 
was very small: Cohen’s d = -.09. As null effects can be difficult to interpret, we computed 
the Scaled-Information Bayes Factor in favor of the null where scale r = .707 (Rouder, 
Speckman, Sun, Morey & Iverson, 2009). This Bayes factor was 3.22, suggesting that the 
data were about 3 times more likely to support the null than alternative hypothesis.  
Process dissociation analysis. Next, we computed the process dissociation 
parameters. As depicted in Table 1, both parameters correlated sensibly with conventional 
relative dilemma judgments, but correlated only mildly with one another, consistent with 
recent meta-analytic findings (Friesdorf et al., 2015). As the parameters are on different 
scales, we always standardized them prior to analysis to eliminate the theoretically 
meaningless main effect of scale. However, analyses using unstandardized parameters obtain 
the same patterns.  
We conducted a 2 (mindset: distrust versus trust) × 2 (parameter: utilitarian versus 
deontological) mixed-model ANOVA with the first factor between-subjects and the second 
factor within-subjects. The results of this analysis revealed no main effect of parameter, F(1, 
87) = .01, p = .919, ηp2 < .001, and no interaction, F(1, 87) = .23, p = .634, ηp2 = .003 (see 
Figure 2). However, we obtained the predicted main effect of mindset: Participants in a 
distrust mindset (M = .27, SD = .87) scored higher on both parameters than those in a trust 
mindset (M = -.18, SD = .67), F(1, 87) = 7.48, p = .008, ηp2 = .079. Post-hoc tests confirmed 
that the deontology parameter was significantly higher in the distrust (M = .31, SD = .98) 
than trust condition, (M = -.20, SD = .97), F(1, 87) = 5.89, p = .017, ηp2 = .063, 95% CIdiff 
.09, .93], and the utilitarian parameter was marginally higher in the distrust (M = .23, SD = 
1.15) than trust condition (M = -.15, SD = .87), F(1, 87) = 3.19, p = .078, ηp2 = .035, 95% 
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CIdiff [-.04, .81]. These findings remained significant when gender was included as a 
covariate.4  
Discussion 
Although no difference between the trust and distrust mindsets emerged for classic 
dilemma judgments, process dissociation revealed that participants in the distrust condition 
scored higher on both parameters—indicating they experienced both stronger inclinations to 
avoid causing harm (deontological inclinations) and stronger inclinations to maximize 
outcomes (utilitarian inclinations) than did participants in a trust mindset. These findings 
suggest that activating distrust jostled participants out of their default dilemma response 
strategy by inducing them to more carefully consider the alternative response, and vice versa, 
thereby ratcheting up their desire to select both responses. These simultaneous increases 
cancelled out for conventional judgments, much like the simultaneous positive effects of 
moral identity on both parameters cancelled out for conventional judgments in Conway and 
Gawronski (2013).  
Study 2 
Although Study 1 offers initial evidence for our argument, conducted an exact 
replication to determine whether this effect is reliable. We also added a control group who 
read only neutral sentences. We anticipated replicating the difference obtained between 
distrust and trust conditions obtained in Study 1. Based on research suggesting that people 
operate in trust mindsets by default (e.g., Mayo, 2015; Schul et al., 2004), we also anticipated 
that a difference might emerge between the neutral and distrust condition, whereas no such 
difference might emerge between the neutral and trust condition. Hence, we anticipated that 
relative to distrust, people in the neutral and trust conditions would score lower on both 
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parameters, as they would be lulled into uncritically selecting a response rather than 
vacillating between responses with some people uncritically selecting one response, and 
others uncritically selecting the other response, leading to a lower net scores than under 
distrust mindsets where we theorized people vacillate. 
Method  
Participants. The final sample consisted of 164 (80 female, 84 male, Mage = 35.91, 
SD = 12.34) American Mechanical Turk workers for pay, after excluding 11 participants 
(distrust: 7, neutral: 0, trust: 4) who reported that their data were unreliable. Effects are 
similar, but approximately half the effect size, when analyzing the full sample. Based on the 
effects obtained in Study 1, we aimed for approximately 180 participants (60 per condition) 
during a single mturk run. A post-hoc power analysis indicated that this sample provided 
~77% power to detect the main effect of mindset across both parameters.  
Materials and procedure. Overall the procedure was the same as Study 1, except we 
added a control group. Participants in the trust and distrust conditions saw the same 25 trust 
or distrust sentences as in Study 1, interspersed with the same 25 filler neutral sentences. 
Participants in the neutral condition saw 25 additional neutral sentences (e.g., They read the 
book) in lieu of the trust/distrust sentences. All participants completed the same dilemma 
battery.5  
Results 
Conventional dilemma analysis. Again, we began by examining the proportion of 
people who accepted harm on incongruent dilemmas in each condition (i.e., who made 
relatively more utilitarian than deontological decisions). Replicating Study 1, an omnibus 
ANOVA revealed no significant difference between accepting harm in the distrust (M = .57, 
DISTRUST AND MORAL JUDGMENT  21 
  
SD = .19), neutral (M = .56, SD = .20), or trust (M = .60, SD = .23) mindset conditions for 
conventional relative moral dilemma judgments, F(2, 161) = .75, p = .475, ηp2 = .009. The 
95% CIs for the difference between both the distrust-neutral [-.08, .08] and neutral-trust 
conditions [-.12, .03] contained zero. The Scaled-Information Bayes Factor in favor of the 
null where scale r = .707 was 4.79, suggesting that the data were almost five times more 
likely to support the null than alternative hypothesis. 
Process dissociation analysis. We again computed the process dissociation 
parameters, and entered them into a 3 (mindset: distrust versus neutral versus trust) × 2 
(parameter: utilitarian versus deontological) mixed-model ANOVA with the first factor 
between-subjects and the second factor within-subjects. As before, the parameters correlated 
sensibly with conventional judgments and one another (see Table 1). This analysis revealed 
no main effect of parameter, F(1, 161) = .01, p = .906, ηp2 < .001, and no interaction, F(2, 
161) = .62, p = .537, ηp2 = .008 (see Figure 3). However, we obtained a marginally 
significant main effect of mindset in the predicted direction, F(2, 161) = 2.87, p = .059, ηp2 = 
.034. Pairwise comparisons indicated that the parameters were significantly higher in the 
distrust (M = .16, SD = .76) than trust condition, (M = -.17, SD = .79), t = 2.30, p = .023, d = 
0.43. The neutral condition (M = .06, SD = .71) fell in between, and did not significantly 
differ from either the distrust, t = -0.65, p = .513, d = -0.14, or trust conditions, t = 1.64, p = 
.103, d = 0.31.  
Considering each parameter separately, post-hoc tests confirmed that the deontology 
parameter was significantly higher in the distrust (M = .21, SD = .85) than trust condition (M 
= -.24, SD = 1.13), t = 2.41, p = .017, d = 0.45, 95% CIdiff [.08, .82], but there was no 
significant difference between the distrust and neutral (M = .01, SD = .91), t = -0.56, p = 
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.575, d = -0.23, 95% CIdiff [-.28, .50], or neutral and trust conditions, t = 1.84, p = .066, d = 
0.24, 95% CIdiff [-.02, .71]. The utilitarian parameter itself did not vary significantly between 
the distrust (M = .11, SD = 1.03) and trust conditions, (M = -.10, SD = .98), t = 1.10, p = .271, 
d = 0.21, 95% CIdiff [-.17, .59], nor distrust versus neutral (M = .02, SD = 1.01), t = -0.44, p = 
.661, d = -0.09, 95% CIdiff [-.31, .48], nor neutral versus trust conditions, t = 0.65, p = .512, d 
= 0.12, 95% CIdiff [-.25, .49].  
Discussion 
Although Study 2 largely failed to reach statistical significance, it garnered a pattern 
of results broadly consistent with Study 1: activating distrust (versus trust) increased 
deontological inclinations, and there was a nonsignificant trend for utilitarian inclinations to 
move in the same direction. Scores in the neutral condition fell in between these extremes, 
albeit non-significantly so. Once again, conventional relative dilemma judgments did not 
vary significantly across mindset condition. However, we did not confirm the stronger 
hypotheses that distrust would increase both parameters relative to the control condition. 
Descriptively, the control condition fell between the trust and distrust conditions, albeit 
closer slightly to the trust condition, suggesting that perhaps trust mindsets approximate the 
default, and distrust mindsets depart from this default (Mayo, 2015; Schul et al., 2004). Due 
to insufficient power and non-significance of the result, such an interpretation remains 
speculative, however. These results were rather weak, but at the very least they do not 
contradict the findings of Study 1. These findings slightly increased our confidence in the 
claim that activating generalized distrust increases the desire to select both available dilemma 
responses. Still, we thought it wise to attempted to replicate this pattern again before drawing 
conclusions regarding how robust it is. Moreover, in Study 3, we assessed a potential 
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mechanism driving this effect: If participants in a distrust (versus trust) mindset experienced 
both stronger inclinations to reject harm and stronger inclinations to accept harm (to 
maximize outcomes), then they should feel more torn between response alternatives, which 
should mediate the effect of distrust on the parameters.  
Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that people in a distrust mindset scored higher on both 
utilitarian and deontological dilemma response tendencies than people in a trust mindset. 
However, the mechanism behind this effect remains unclear. The distrust mindset literature 
indicates that distrust induces people to engage in non-routine processing and to consider 
alternatives (Schul et al., 2004, 2008; Posten & Mussweiler, 2013), as under distrust, 
considering one concept automatically activates alternatives (Kleiman et al., 2015). In 
addition, distrust enhances cognitive flexibility, possibly increasing creative consideration of 
implications of each dilemma judgment (Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011). Hence, we theorized 
that distrust leads participants to second-guess their default dilemma response, and carefully 
consider the alternative response—whereupon they may reconsider their default response. If 
this explanation is correct, then participants in a distrust (versus trust) mindset should feel 
more torn between the available response options, which should mediate the impact of the 
manipulation on the parameters.  
Importantly, the direction of mediation should depend on which response alternatives 
people consider. Recall that for incongruent dilemmas, causing harm maximizes outcomes, 
so rejecting harm is consistent with deontology and accepting harm is consistent with 
utilitarianism. Accordingly, when distrust increases the desire to select both of the response 
options for incongruent dilemmas, people ought to score higher on both the deontological 
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and utilitarian parameters. In other words, feeling torn on incongruent dilemmas should 
positively mediate the effect of distrust on each parameter. Conversely, for congruent 
dilemmas, causing harm does not maximize outcomes. Therefore, rejecting harm is 
consistent with both deontology and utilitarianism, whereas accepting harm is consistent with 
neither (though still consistent with other, non-moral motives, such as self-interest, 
vengeance, and sadism). Hence, ambivalence on congruent dilemmas is effectively 
ambivalence between, on the one hand, an answer consistent with deontology and 
utilitarianism, versus, on the other hand, an answer consistent with neither (but confident 
with self-interest, vengeance, sadism, etc.). Therefore, ambivalence on congruent dilemmas 
reflects reduced deontological and utilitarian concerns versus other dilemma considerations. 
Accordingly, feeling torn on congruent dilemmas should negatively mediate the effect of 
distrust on each parameter, because such ambivalence reflects ambivalence between a moral 
(deontological/utilitarian) response and an amoral/immoral response.  
Moreover, both of these mediation effects may occur simultaneously within the same 
analysis. Distrust may increase the desire to select both responses for incongruent dilemmas, 
increasing both moral responses, yet also increase desire to select both responses for 
congruent dilemmas, decreasing both moral responses by pitting them against an immoral 
alternative. So long as people feel more torn on incongruent than congruent dilemmas 
overall, the former effect will win out against the latter, resulting in a net increase in both 
parameters. We anticipated that people would indeed feel more torn between response 
options for incongruent than for congruent dilemmas, as past work has demonstrated that 
people find incongruent dilemmas more difficult to resolve than congruent ones (Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013; Friesdorf et al., 2015). We examined these possibilities in Study 3.6 
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Method  
Participants. The sample consisted of 124 American Mechanical Turk workers for 
pay (65 female, 59 male, Mage = 36.20, SD = 10.77), after we excluded 10 participants 
(distrust: 4, trust: 6) who indicated either a) their data were unreliable using the same 
measure as Study 2 (3), or who reported completing the PD dilemma battery in previous 
unrelated research (7). Effects are actually stronger when analyzing the full sample. We 
again aimed for ~60 participants per cell in a single mturk run. A post-hoc power analysis 
indicated that this sample provided ~99% power to detect the main effect of mindset across 
both parameters.  
Procedure. Again, we employed the scrambled-sentences task to induce trust or 
distrust mindsets and assessed responses to the Conway and Gawronski (2013) dilemma 
battery. However, this time before participants made each dilemma judgment, we also 
assessed how torn they felt between the available response options: I feel torn between the 
two answer choices on a scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree; adapted 
from Jamieson, 1993). We separately computed feeling torn scores regarding incongruent (α 
= .63) and congruent dilemmas (α = .64).7  
Results 
Conventional dilemma analysis. As before, there was no significant difference in 
accepting outcome-maximizing harm in classic dilemmas across the distrust (M = .56, SD = 
.18) and trust (M = .56, SD = .19) mindset conditions, t(122) = -0.14, p = .889, 95% CIdiff [-
.07, .06]. The Scaled-Information Bayes Factor in favor of the null when scale r =.707 was 
4.01, suggesting that the data were about 4 times more likely to support the null than 
alternative hypothesis. 
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Process dissociation analysis. Once again, we conducted a 2 (mindset: distrust 
versus trust) × 2 (parameter: utilitarian versus deontological) mixed-model ANOVA with the 
first factor between-subjects and the second factor within-subjects. Again, the parameters 
evinced a sensible pattern of correlations with conventional judgments and one another (see 
Table 1). Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, this analysis revealed no main effect of parameter, 
F(1, 122) = .01, p = .941, ηp2 < .001, and no interaction, F(1, 122) = .86, p = .356, ηp2 = .01 
(see Figure 4). However, we again found the predicted main effect of mindset: Participants in 
a distrust mindset (M = .27, SD = .66) scored higher on both parameters than those in a trust 
mindset (M = -.33, SD = .90), F(1, 122) = 18.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. Post-hoc tests confirmed 
that the deontology parameter was significantly higher in the distrust (M = .23, SD = .99) 
than trust condition, (M = -.27, SD = .95), F(1, 122) = 8.44, p = .004, ηp2 = .07, 95% CIdiff 
[.16, .86]. This time, the utilitarian parameter was also significantly higher in the distrust (M 
= .32, SD = .75) than trust condition (M = -.38, SD = 1.12), F(1, 122) = 16.80, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.12, 95% CIdiff [.36, 1.03].  
Perceived ambivalence. We examined whether feeling torn scores varied across the 
trust/distrust mindset conditions in response to both incongruent and congruent dilemmas by 
conducting a 2 (mindset: distrust versus trust) × 2 (dilemma: incongruent versus congruent) 
mixed-model ANOVA with the first factor between-subjects and the second factor within-
subjects. This analysis revealed a significant effect of mindset: overall, participants in the 
distrust mindset reported feeling more torn (M = 4.08, SD = 1.09) than participants in the 
trust mindset (M = 3.59, SD = 1.20), F(1, 122) = 5.54, p = .020, ηp2 = .04. In addition, there 
was a main effect of dilemma: overall, considering incongruent dilemmas increased feeling 
torn (M = 4.36, SD = 1.33) more than considering congruent dilemmas (M = 3.34, SD = 
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1.22), F(1, 122) = 112.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .48. Neither of these effects were qualified by a 
significant interaction, F(1, 122) = .02, p = .897, ηp2 < .001.  
Post-hoc contrasts indicated that people felt significantly more torn between response 
options for incongruent dilemmas in the distrust (M = 4.59, SD = 1.25) than trust (M = 4.11, 
SD = 1.39) condition, F(1, 122) = 3.94, p = .049, ηp2 = .03, 95% CIdiff [.001, .94]. Similarly, 
people felt significantly more torn regarding congruent dilemmas in the distrust (M = 3.57, 
SD = 1.18) than trust (M = 3.08, SD = 1.23) condition, F(1, 122) = 5.26, p = .024, ηp2 = .04, 
95% CIs for the difference [.07, .93]. These findings confirm that a) the distrust mindset 
indeed increased how torn people felt between the available response options for both kinds 
of dilemmas, and b) overall, people felt more torn between options for incongruent than 
congruent dilemmas (consistent with past work on difficulty ratings; Conway & Gawronski, 
2013). Moreover, these findings held when controlling for gender, which was important as 
women typically report more difficulty in resolving such moral dilemmas than do men 
(Friesdorf et al., 2015).8 
Deontology parameter mediation. Finally, to determine whether feeling torn 
between response options mediated the impact of our mindset manipulation on each process 
dissociation parameter, we used the PROCESS macro in SPSS 22 (IBM Corp., 2013) to 
conduct two 5000-iteration simultaneous mediation bootstrap analyses according to the 
procedures recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004). We coded mindset 1 = distrust, 0 = 
trust. The first analysis examined whether feeling torn on each dilemma type simultaneously 
mediated the impact of distrust (versus trust) mindset on the deontology parameter, 
controlling for the utilitarian parameter (see Figure 5). Again, as expected, a distrust (versus 
trust) mindset increased feeling torn on both incongruent dilemmas, B = .51, SE = .25, p = 
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.042, 95% CI [.02, .99], and congruent dilemmas, B = .75, SE = .21, p < .001, 95% CI [.34, 
1.16]. More importantly, there was a significant indirect effect of distrust mindset on the 
deontology parameter through feeling torn on incongruent dilemmas, B = .11, SE = .09, 95% 
CI [.001, .35], as the confidence intervals excluded zero. Additionally, there was a significant 
negative indirect effect on the deontology parameter through feeling torn on congruent 
dilemmas, B = -.35, SE = .13, 95% CI [-.66, -.14], as these confidence intervals also excluded 
zero. This pattern held when adding gender as a covariate.  
Utilitarian parameter mediation. The second analysis examined whether feeling 
torn on each dilemma type simultaneously mediated the impact of distrust (versus trust) 
mindset on the utilitarian parameter, controlling for the deontology parameter (see Figure 6). 
Again, as expected, we found a significant indirect effect of distrust mindset on the utilitarian 
parameter through feeling torn on incongruent dilemmas, B = .10, SE = .06, 95% CI [.01, 
.28], as the confidence intervals excluded zero. Additionally, there was again a significant 
negative indirect effect through feeling torn on congruent dilemmas, B = -.26, SE = .10, 95% 
CI [-.50, -.10], as these confidence intervals also excluded zero. Again, this pattern held 
when adding gender as a covariate.  
Discussion 
Study 3 replicated the pattern found in Studies 1 and 2: participants in a distrust 
mindset made similar conventional moral judgments as participants in a trust mindset. 
However, it appears that the distrust mindset manipulation nonetheless impacted moral 
dilemma processing: participants in a distrust mindset scored higher on both the deontology 
and utilitarian parameters than participants in a trust mindset. Moreover, participants in a 
distrust mindset reported feeling more torn between available answer options than 
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participants in a trust mindset—and this effect mediated the impact of distrust mindset on the 
parameters. As incongruent dilemmas pit a deontological option against a utilitarian option, 
this finding suggests that a distrust mindset induced participants to vacillate between 
choosing both dilemma options, thereby ramping up the inclination to choose each.  
Notably, participants in a distrust mindset also felt torn between response options 
when facing congruent dilemmas. Congruent dilemmas pit one response option—rejecting 
harm that does not maximize outcomes (consistent with both deontology and 
utilitarianism)—against another response option—accepting non-outcome-maximizing harm 
(inconsistent with both deontology and utilitarianism, but consistent with non-moral motives 
such as self-interest, vengeance, or sadism). In other words, on congruent dilemmas, distrust 
increased ambivalence between deontological and utilitarian responses, on the one hand, 
versus amoral or immoral responses on the other. Hence, ambivalence in congruent dilemmas 
mediated reductions in both PD parameters—even as ambivalence in incongruent dilemmas 
simultaneously increased both parameters. This finding indicates that a distrust mindset 
induced participants to vacillate more between whichever two options were available. In the 
case of incongruent dilemmas, these two responses reflected utilitarian and deontological 
concerns respectively, ratcheting up both response tendencies. Conversely, in the case of 
congruent dilemmas, distrust caused participants to vacillate between one answer that 
satisfies both deontological and utilitarian concerns versus another answer reflecting amoral 
or immoral concerns, thereby reducing the tendency to endorse deontological and utilitarian 
concerns relative to other concerns.  
General Discussion 
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Together, the results of three studies demonstrated a consistent pattern: activating a 
generalized distrust (versus trust) mindset increased participants’ inclination to consider both 
the deontological and utilitarian response options when facing moral dilemmas. These 
simultaneous increases cancelled one another out in conventional relative dilemma 
judgments. Distrust increased reports that people felt torn between the available response 
options, and feeling torn, in turn, mediated the effect of distrust on both response 
inclinations. Importantly, the effect of feeling torn on response inclinations depended upon 
which options people considered. When distrust increased feeling torn on incongruent 
dilemmas where rejecting harm is consistent with deontology and accepting harm is 
consistent with utilitarianism, people scored higher on both deontological and utilitarian 
response inclinations. Conversely, when distrust increased feeling torn on congruent 
dilemmas where rejecting harm is consistent with both deontology and utilitarianism, and 
accepting harm is consistent with non-moral motives, people scored lower on both 
deontological and utilitarian response inclinations. However, people felt more torn between 
response options for incongruent than congruent dilemmas overall, leading to an overall 
effect of distrust increasing both deontological and utilitarian response inclinations across 
three studies.  
This pattern suggests that upon encountering a moral dilemma where people prefer 
one or the other response by default, distrust jostled people out of their default response 
strategy, inducing them to more carefully consider the available alternative response, 
ratcheting up their desire to select both responses. Conversely, trust allowed people to 
uncritically select whichever response they prefer by default without carefully considering 
the alternative, resulting in net lower response inclinations overall. Such an effect is invisible 
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when examining judgments of only classic dilemmas that treat deontological and utilitarian 
responses as opposites, because these simultaneous increases in response inclinations cancel 
one another out.  
Note that not all findings reached significance (specifically in Study 2), and we 
conducted three additional studies that remained in the file drawer. Therefore, we conducted 
both fixed and random effect meta-analyses across all samples, correcting for differences in 
sample sizes (Hunter & Schmit, 1990). Fixed effect analysis revealed significant effects for 
both the deontology, ES = -.20, SE = .03, Z = -5.93, p < .001, 95% CI [-.27, -.14], and 
utilitarian parameters, ES = -.14, SE = .03, Z = -4.08, p < .001, 95% CI [-.21, -.07]. However, 
the random effects model revealed a significant effect only for the deontology parameter, ES 
= -.24, SE = .11, Z = -2.23, p = .026, 95% CI [-.45, -.03], as the effect for the utilitarian 
parameter fell below threshold, ES = -.20, SE = .14, Z = -1.36, p = .173, 95% CI [-.48, .08] 
(see Supplement for details).  
Implications for Trust/Distrust and Moral Judgment Research 
These findings mesh with the broader literature on distrust mindsets, which suggest 
that distrust increases the activation, generation, and selection of creative alternatives and 
alternatives to default positions (e.g., Mayer & Mussweiler, 2012; Posten & Mussweiler, 
2013; Schul, et al., 2004). In the current work, generalized distrust increased reports of 
feeling torn between whichever choice options were presented, and participants in a distrust 
mindset evinced stronger inclinations to select both options. This pattern corroborates past 
work on generalized trust and distrust mindsets indicating that distrust leads people to engage 
in non-routine processing where they carefully consider alternative options rather than 
uncritically accepting their initial perspective (e.g., Posten & Mussweiler, 2013). Hence, 
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these findings provide further support to cognitive models of generalized trust and distrust 
while extending investigation of this phenomenon from decision-making (Schul & Peri, 
2015) to moral decision-making in particular.  
Moreover, these findings are inconsistent with other plausible predictions. If 
generalized undermines confidence in evidence, similar to distrust of specific targets (e.g., 
Darke & Ritchie, 2007; Schul & Peri, 2015), then distrust may have reduced one or both 
parameters, by reducing confidence that actions will cause harm or lead to beneficial 
outcomes. If generalized distrust operates by increasing negative affect, it should have 
selectively increased the deontological parameter (Conway & Gawronski, 2013), and if it 
operated by inducing a general negativity bias then it should have increased the acceptability 
of harm, hence reducing both parameters. Yet, instead distrust increased both the deontology 
and utilitarian parameters, supporting our argument that distrust mindsets ratchet people up 
between response alternatives. In addition, our findings have implications for moral dilemma 
research. Specifically, these findings contribute to a growing body of work that illustrates 
how conventional data analytic techniques fail to fully describe the psychological processes 
involved in moral decision-making. Conventional methods assess only the relative 
contributions of processes underlying dilemma judgments. Had we conducted these studies 
using conventional relative judgments, we would have concluded that inducing a distrust 
mindset has no impact on the processes underlying dilemma judgments because these relative 
judgments themselves did not change. In contrast, employing process dissociation to 
independently assess the absolute strength of each underlying process enabled us to detect 
how distrust simultaneously increased both deontological and utilitarian inclinations relative 
to trust. This pattern resembles the relation between moral identity and moral judgments: 
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moral identity positively correlated with both parameters, which canceled out in conventional 
judgments (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Such results are of paramount importance in light 
of recent calls to abandon moral dilemma research due to confusing relations between 
conventional judgments and other measures (Kahane, 2015). The current findings suggest 
that such calls are premature, as confused relations may be the product of conventional data 
analytic techniques rather than conceptual errors. Employing process dissociation may clarify 
these otherwise confusing findings.  
Quality of Moral Decision-Making 
Our findings suggest that when facing difficult ethical decisions, generalized distrust 
mindsets may lead people to more carefully consider the available options before ultimately 
arriving at a given judgment. Therefore, distrust mindsets have the potential to improve the 
quality of moral decision-making—depending on which options people consider. If people 
consider a choice between two morally-defensible alternatives, as in classic dilemmas where 
causing harm maximizes outcomes, then distrust may induce them to engage in a more 
balanced consideration of both alternatives rather than rushing to uncritically select their 
default preference. Granted, it is possible for people to arrive at the same dilemma decision 
using different strategies, but it seems reasonable that decisions based on considering both 
sides of complex moral issues, rather than zealous focus on a single aspect, are usually 
preferable, despite the subjectively negative experience of decision conflict. Consistent with 
this perspective, considering multiple aspects of controversial issues can be socially adaptive 
(Pillaud, Cavazza, & Butera, 2013); the way people arrive at moral judgments can have 
important social consequences (e.g., Critcher, Inbar, & Pizarro, 2013). Hence, distrust may 
be effective at improving decisions where there are moral merits to both sides, such as 
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deciding which friend to support in a disagreement where both are partially at fault, or 
settling land disputes between social groups who both have legitimate claims. Considering 
both options may allow individuals to take the perspective of others, which can be important 
in conflicts about moral issues.  
However, distrust might be problematic when people face simpler decisions where 
one option is unethical but tempting and the other is ethical. Under distrust, considering the 
ethical option should also automatically activate the unethical alternative, increasing 
temptation to select it, and increased decisional conflict. Such cases may include congruent 
moral dilemmas, but also decisions such as whether to accept a bribe or whether or not to 
cooperate in social dilemmas. In such cases, trust mindsets may be more effective at 
promoting ethical decision-making, especially considering that many people’s initial 
inclinations tend towards the prosocial (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012). Future work should 
consider clarifying the pragmatic potential of applying distrust and trust mindsets to improve 
decision-making in different contexts.  
Specific versus Generalized Distrust  
In the current work, we examined the impact of generalized distrust and trust 
mindsets, where the effects of trust/distrust cues extent to information and targets beyond the 
distrust-eliciting stimulus (consistent with a large body of work, e.g., Schul, et al., 2004). 
Note that the potentially positive impact of generalized distrust on moral decision-making 
stands in opposition to the impact of interpersonal distrust towards a specific target, which 
can reduce the ethicality of moral decisions as people act selfishly due to fear of being 
exploited (Gollwitzer, Rothmund, & Süßenbach, 2013). Hence, generalized distrust and 
particularized distrust of specific individuals may have very different impacts on moral 
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judgment. Whereas target-specific distrust may evoke the same general cognitive processes 
as generalized distrust (i.e., non-routine processing), these effects may be superimposed by 
the more specific—and motivational—impacts of specific interpersonal distrust (e.g., fear of 
exploitation, suspicion, negative evaluations, concern about malevolent intentions), which 
may result in reduced ethical behavior. This idea is consistent with previous work on the 
differential effects of “diffuse” and “focused” trust/distrust in the domain of decision making 
(Schul & Peri, 2015). 
Limitations 
Although the current findings provide new insight into the relation between distrust 
and moral judgment, like all studies they suffer from some limitations. First, it remains 
unclear from the current work whether the impact of distrust on moral judgment is due to 
non-social aspects of distrust (e.g., distrusting one’s initial inclination, as advised by Charles 
de Talleyrand) or social aspects of distrust (e.g., distrusting particular interaction partners, as 
advised by Frank Herbert). We have framed our argument in terms of the cognitive elements 
of distrust, due to the unfocused and target-independent way we activated trust and distrust 
mindsets in our studies. Hence, the cognitive aspects of distrust seem to be the most plausible 
explanation for the effects, in line with the existing literature on trust and distrust mindsets 
(e.g., Schul et al., 2004, 2008), and the dual-process model of moral judgment (Greene et al., 
2001). However, in addition, recent work has begun to explore the social implications of 
moral judgments, and suggests that people link dilemma judgments to the moral self 
(Conway & Gawronski, 2013), and modify their judgments depending on social 
circumstances (Lucas & Livingston, 2014). Therefore, social aspects of distrust may also 
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play a role in moral judgments. Future work might profitably examine this by separately 
inducing social and non-social distrust mindsets.  
Another limitation of the present work is that mood effects cannot be ruled out 
completely, as we did not assess this construct. However, it seems implausible that mood 
could explain the results. Neither Mayer and Mussweiler (2011), nor Posten and Mussweiler 
(2013), nor Mayo and colleagues (2014) found any effects on mood using similar paradigms. 
Moreover, dilemma research suggests that negative emotions push dilemma judgments in 
specific directions (Strohminger, Lewis, & Meyer, 2011; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006)—that 
is, selectively increasing deontological responses (Conway & Gawronski, 2013)—rather than 
simultaneously increasing both response tendencies as seen in the current data. Thus, 
although we cannot completely rule out the possibility that mood influenced effects in the 
current work, such an explanation would be inconsistent with past findings.  
These findings also leave an important theoretical question regarding the mechanism 
involved. On the one hand, distrust may increase the salience of alternative responses—such 
that responses which would have been discarded previously now enters consideration. In 
other words, distrust reduces the threshold needed for consideration of alternatives. On the 
other hand, distrust may increase the weight assigned to the alternative response. In this view, 
people typically experience a modest degree of vacillation between responses, but distrust 
increases the weight of each consideration, thereby increasing the degree of vacillation. 
Current results are potentially compatible with either mechanism. Future work should seek to 
distinguish between them. The analyses of classic dilemma responses and process 
dissociation parameters bear another caveat, relying on aggregate data and a between-
subjects design. Specifically, even though trust versus distrust mindsets did not evince an 
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effect on overt dilemma judgments, it may potentially be the case that distrust affected 
individual participants in different directions, cancelling out in the overall sample. Such a 
possibility would be in line with some participants, potentially those with a predominantly 
utilitarian default response, showing a greater increase in the deontology parameter and 
others showing a relatively stronger increase in the utilitarian parameter. While we assume 
that the cognitive processes involved in distrust should lead to an increase in both judgment 
inclinations within participants, such a pattern may also possibly produce similar results. 
Therefore, while present studies robustly show that distrust versus trust does affect moral 
processing via increased ambivalence, the possibility remains that distrust has other effects. 
For example, recent work suggests that dilemma decisions may involve an element of self-
presentation (Rom, Weiss, & Conway, 2017). It remains possible that distrust makes people 
more acutely aware of self-presentational concerns, thereby altering judgments. Future work 
should examine this possibility.  
Finally, the current work suffers from a limitation common to all moral dilemma 
research: moral dilemmas are (necessarily) hypothetical scenarios (due to the extreme harm 
involved) and therefore may not always reflect people’s actual decisions in real life (Francis 
et al., 2016; Patil, Cogoni, Zangrando, Chittaro, & Silani, 2014). Although it is certainly 
desirable to employ ecologically valid stimuli, nonetheless hypothetical stimuli remain 
valuable if they allow for drawing distinctions between different psychological processes and 
demonstrate how each process contributes to judgment, as moral dilemmas do (Cushman & 
Greene, 2012). In real life, perhaps the contributions of these processes may differ, but that 
does not alter the utility of understanding the operation of each contributing process, as the 
current paradigm allows. Moreover, there are numerous real-life examples of moral 
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dilemmas. For example, the German Parliament and courts recently debated whether it is 
acceptable for the military to destroy a hijacked civilian airliner to prevent it from causing 
widespread destruction (Whitlock, 2006), and the acceptability of harm to innocent civilians 
(‘collateral damage’) is a common consideration in military interventions aimed at stabilizing 
collapsing regimes. Therefore, moral dilemmas are less hypothetical than many people may 
assume.  
Conclusion 
Returning to the animal research dilemma described at the beginning—should you 
torture animals to help cure AIDS? Our findings suggest that if you experience a distrustful 
state of mind, you are more likely to question your default inclination and consider the 
alternative response. On the other hand, you may uncritically select your default dilemma 
response if you are in a trusting state of mind. But beware! Frank Herbert and Maurice de 
Talleyrand were skeptical of those who fail to question their initial position, even (or 
especially) when trying to improve the world. Many ethical problems involve complex trade-
offs between different parties. The present research suggests that generalized distrust may 
result in more balanced consideration of these different interests in complex moral decision-
making. Sometimes it may be wise to distrust one’s moral compass.   
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Notes 
1 Note that the influence of distrust is qualitatively different than merely inducing greater 
cognitive effort. Distrust should jostle people out of their default response strategy regardless 
of which response they preferred by default. Conversely, inducing cognitive effort should 
selectively increase the utilitarian parameter, rather than both parameters (Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013). 
2 Note that this application of PD does not allow for the calculation of a ‘guessing parameter’ 
to disentangle construct-irrelevant responding (e.g., inattentive responding) from construct-
relevant responding. Unlike other applications of PD (Payne & Bishara, 2009), there is only 
one congruent and incongruent block, resulting in insufficient degrees of freedom for a 
guessing parameter to vary independently. Hence, this PD model requires making one of two 
assumptions in the case where neither utilitarian nor deontological concerns drive dilemma 
judgments, depending on which calculation model one employs. Here we employ the ‘U-
dominant’ model, which begins with deriving utilitarian inclinations, and assumes that only 
when such inclinations do not drive responses, then deontological inclinations may drive 
responses. In PD, the third case (when neither utilitarian nor deontological concerns drives 
responses) is mathematically constrained to be the opposite of the second case, so the U-
dominant model makes the assumption that in the absence of U or D, participants will 
systematically accept harm (see Figure 1). We suggest this assumption is not unreasonable 
theoretically; it suggests that in the absence of deontological or utilitarian concerns, people 
feel free to accept harm. Yet, this assumption will be inaccurate to the degree that construct-
irrelevant responding leads participants to reject harm (e.g., inattentive responding may result 
in a roughly equal mixture of harm acceptance and rejection). To the degree that this 
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assumption is violated, the parameters may be inflated because construct-irrelevant 
responding that leads people to reject harm will load on the D parameter, and will also load 
on the U parameter when that harm-rejection occurs in congruent dilemmas. Clearly, this 
assumption is suboptimal; yet, we argue it remains preferable to the assumptions made by the 
alternative ‘D-dominant’ model. The D-dominant model starts by deriving deontological 
inclinations (always reject harm), and assumes that only when such inclinations do not drive 
responses then utilitarian inclinations may do so. Again, the third case is constrained to be 
the opposite of the second case, so this model makes the less-plausible theoretical assumption 
that in the absence of deontological or utilitarian concerns, participants will demonstrate an 
‘anti-utilitarian’ pattern of ‘maximum carnage:’ only cause harm that makes the world worse, 
and never cause harm that makes the world better. This assumption has the advantage of 
including both harm acceptance (for congruent dilemmas) and harm rejection (for 
incongruent dilemmas) in the third case, which suggests that non-construct variance will 
somewhat cancel out to the degree that it entails randomly rejecting vs. accepting harm. 
However, to the degree that construct-irrelevant responding leads participants to accept harm 
for incongruent dilemmas and reject harm for congruent dilemmas, this variance will inflate 
the U parameter.  
There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to prefer the U-dominant model (see 
Conway and Gawronski, 2013, Appendix B). Most important, it seems more theoretically 
splausible that in the absence of either deontological or utilitarian concerns (neither concern 
for causing harm nor maximizing outcomes), people evince a general, non-specific disregard 
for others’ well-being, which also enables them to pursue other goals, such as self-interest 
(for example, in the congruent crying baby dilemma, causing harm allows one to escape 
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working in a mine). We find this assumption more plausible than the D-dominant assumption 
that in the absence of either deontological or utilitarian concerns, people evince a response 
strategy that systematically selects the worst possible outcome (for example, this would 
involve killing the baby to avoid working in a mine, but refusing to kill the baby to save 
oneself from death). Moreover, by beginning with deriving the process theorized to involve 
more cognitive deliberation, the U-dominant model is analogous to all other PD research, 
which also begin by deriving parameters tapping controlled processing (Payne & Bishara, 
2009), except one paper on Stroop performance (Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994). Therefore, we 
suggest the U-dominant model, despite making suboptimal assumptions, nonetheless remains 
preferable to the D-dominant model with its even more suboptimal assumptions.  
One way to partially address concerns over these problematic assumptions in the 
absence of a guessing parameter is to compute both the U-dominant and D-dominant 
parameters and see whether effects hold across both calculations. Indeed, the main effect of 
the trust mindset manipulation on the D-dominant parameters demonstrated a very similar 
pattern as with U-dominant parameters: Study 1, F(1, 86) = 6.12, p = .015, ηp2 = .07, Study 2, 
F(2, 158) = 2.58, p = .079, ηp2 = .032, Study 3, F(1, 131) = 24.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .16 (note 
the D-dominant method requires excluding a few participants due to division-by zero errors). 
Moreover, the D-dominant parameters correlated highly with their U-dominant counterparts. 
As these methods employ somewhat different calculations and make different assumptions 
about the pattern of responding in the third case, the fact that patterns hold across both 
models suggests that concerns about violated assumptions may not be so great as to threaten 
construct validity.  
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Note that some theorists have aimed to tackle this issue by including additional 
dilemmas where action is coded as leading to a deontological decision and inaction is coded 
as leading to a utilitarian decision: the CNI Model (Gawronski et al., 2015; 2017; 2018). This 
model allows for estimation of three parameters: a C parameter tracking adherence to 
consequences, an N parameter is designed to track consistency with deontological norms, 
and an I parameter tracking systematic inaction tendencies to either act or refrain from action 
independent of consequences or deontological norms. Although this model suggests a 
promising avenue for disentangling systematic but construct-irrelevant responding from 
theoretically relevant responding, in doing so it fundamentally changes the nature of the 
constructs under examination as represented by the parameters of interest. Specifically, in 
classic dilemmas the deontological option always requires refraining from causing harm; in 
contrast, in reversed CNI dilemmas the deontological option requires acting to save one 
person at the expense of inflicting suffering on others. Although this action is coded as 
‘consistent with deontological norms,’ it remains unclear whether this coding best describes 
this action. Both deontological theorists (e.g., Kant, 1785/1959; Baron, 1994) and lay people 
(e.g., Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009) endorse the 
distinction between causing harm via action versus omission as an important deontological 
distinction, yet the CNI model equates these two forms of action in their capacity to represent 
the adherence to deontological norms. Moreover, this action causes harm, suggesting it 
should also be coded as inconsistent with deontological norms, as any action that causes 
harm violates deontological norms against causing harm. Indeed, it may be impossible to 
present scenarios where action leads to a decision truly consistent with deontological 
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norms—deontological norms may always require refraining from action. Hence, we 
recommend caution when comparing the results of PD studies with the CNI model.  
3 Results of Study 1 when excluding three people were nearly identical to the full sample. 
Conventional dilemmas were not significantly impacted by the manipulation, t(83) = -0.01, p 
= .996, 95% CIdiff [0-.09 .09], but the main effect of condition on the parameters remained 
significant, F(1, 83) = 6.47, p = .013, ηp2 = .072. Post-hoc tests confirmed that the deontology 
parameter remained significant, F(1, 83) = 4.35, p = .040, ηp2 = .050, 95% CIdiff [.02, .89], 
and the utilitarian parameter slightly improved but remained marginal, F(1, 83) = 3.39, p = 
.069, ηp2 = .039, 95% CIdiff [-.03, .84].  
4 A recent meta-analysis indicated that gender is a strong predictor of moral dilemma 
judgments, with women scoring much higher than men on the deontology parameter, and 
men scoring slightly higher than women on the utilitarian parameter (Friesdorf et al., 2015). 
The pattern of gender effects in all of the current studies matched this meta-analytic pattern. 
Therefore, in all studies we re-ran the main analysis treating gender as a covariate. In Study 
2, the omnibus effect of condition weakened when gender was included as a covariate to F(2, 
160) = 2.28, p = .107. In all other cases, the effects of trust/distrust mindsets remained 
significant when controlling for gender. Hence, the current findings cannot be attributed to 
gender. 5 At the end of the study, participants also reported perceived task difficulty for the 
scrambled sentences (How difficult did you find the task where you unscrambled the 
sentences? 1 = very easy, 7 = very difficult), and dilemmas (How difficult did you find it to 
make a decision for the stories overall? 1 = very easy, 7 = very difficult), as well as dilemma 
decision importance (How important was it to you to make the right decision for the stories 
overall? 1 = not at all important, 7 = very important). We assessed these questions to 
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determine whether overall perceptions of the tasks varied across condition. Task difficulty 
for the scrambled sentences did not significantly vary across the distrust (M = 2.76, SD = 
1.58), neutral (M = 2.33, SD = 1.35), and trust (M = 2.22, SD = 1.32) mindset conditions, 
F(2, 161) = 2.12, p = .123, ηp2 = .03. Nor did dilemma difficulty perceptions significantly 
vary across the distrust (M = 3.53, SD = 1.70), neutral (M = 3.38, SD = 1.78), and trust (M = 
3.83, SD = 1.74) mindset conditions, F(2, 161) = .97, p = .383, ηp2 = .01. Unexpectedly, 
perceived decision importance did vary significantly across the distrust (M = 6.12, SD = .88), 
neutral (M = 6.52, SD = .70), and trust (M = 6.16, SD = .99) mindset conditions, F(2, 161) = 
3.33, p = .038, ηp2 = .04. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that participants in the neutral 
condition rated their dilemma decisions as more important than participants in either the 
distrust, t = 2.35, p = .024, d = 0.50, 95% CIdiff [-.74, -.05], or trust conditions, t = 2.25, p = 
.029, d = 0.42, 95% CIdiff [-.68, -.04], which did not differ from one another, t = -0.25, p = 
.828, d = -0.04, 95% CIdiff [-.36, .29]. However, adding this variable as a covariate to the 
main analysis does not appreciably change the parameter pattern, so this finding cannot 
explain the effects of distrust mindsets on the parameters.  
6 Note that in Study 2, perceived dilemma difficulty did not vary across condition, but we 
measured it only once at the end of the study. Thus, it reflects a recollection of perceived 
difficulty across the entire battery of moral dilemmas after all decisions are complete. 
Conversely, in Study 3 we measured online perceptions of feeling torn between available 
response alternatives for each dilemma during the moment of deliberation before participants 
reported their dilemma judgment. Hence, although these measures are conceptually similar, 
we expected the richer online measure in employed in Study 3 to demonstrate sensitivity to 
the mindset manipulation even though dilemma difficulty in Study 2 did not.  
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7 Although reliabilities for the measures of feeling torn were somewhat low, this is to be 
expected for dilemmas representing a wide range of variation in content. Note that lower than 
ideal reliabilities make the reported analyses more conservative by increasing the difficulty 
of finding significant effects.  
8 In this study we again assessed perceptions of the task difficulty for the scrambled-
sentences task. Difficulty perceptions were similar across the distrust (M = 2.37, SD = 1.52) 
and trust (M = 2.46, SD = 2.08) mindset conditions, t(132) = -0.30, p = .764, d = -0.05, 95% 
CIdiff [-.54, .68].   
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Appendix A– Scrambled-Sentences Distrust/Trust Mindset Induction 
 
Dilemma and Scrambled Sentence Task Instructions:  
On the following screens you will see a series of 20 short stories. Please read them 
carefully, then make a judgment about the stories. There is no right or wrong answer; we are 
simply interested in your personal opinion. Even though some stories may seem similar, each 
story is different in important ways. Please note that some stories refer to things that may 
seem unpleasant to think about. This is because we are interested in people's thoughts about 
difficult, real-life issues.  
In between the stories, we will also ask you to complete a language skill task. More 
precisely, after each of the stories you will be asked to create a sentence from a set of words, 
twice. Each set consists of five words, but you will be asked to use only four of these words 
to form a grammatically correct sentence. Please use only the words that are provided 
without changing any of the words by adding or subtracting letters. Uppercase and lowercase 
are not important.  
Sometimes, there may be several solutions to this task. Any grammatically correct 
sentence is fine. Please write down the sentence you created in the space provided, and work 
as fast and accurately as possible.  
Example: GROW TREES BAG ON LEMONS Solution: Lemons grow on trees.  
Before the first story, we will give you ten practice scrambled sentences to get used to 
the task. Please click on "Continue" to proceed to the first practice sentence. 
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Distrust Condition  
Interspersed with neutral sentences.  
Scrambled Sentence Solution 
UNRELIABLE SOME ARE BAG FRIENDS Some friends are unreliable 
TWO-FACED A BIRD PERSON HE’S  He's a two-faced person 
FELT DISBELIEF SOMETIMES PEN SHE Sometimes she felt disbelief 
APPEARS PATH THE RAKES UNCERTAIN The path appears uncertain 
PLANS UNDERMINED THE CEREAL THEY  They undermined the plans 
THE IS DISTRUSTED PEACE HE  He distrusted the peace 
FAKED COUCH TEST WAS THE The test was faked 
TRUST THEY THEM POOL CAN’T  They can't trust them 
QUESTIONES DRINK ASKED HE MISLEADING He asked misleading questions 
SUSPICION THERE MAN GROWING WAS There was growing suspicion  
ARTICLE WAS THE FABRICATED DOOR  The article was fabricated 
A ANSWER SLIPPERY GOING THAT’S That's a slippery answer 
LEAF IS UNSOUND ARGUMENT THE The argument is unsound 
ULTERIOR HAS RUG HE MOTIVES He has ulterior motives 
DOUBLE A AGENT HE‘S UMBRELLA He's a double agent 
BETRAYAL REEKS OF STAPLER THAT  That reeks of betrayal 
HE’S MILK SHADY A CHARACTER He's a shady character 
THOUGHT PLACING THAT’S TREACHEROUS A That's a treacherous thought 
LYING THEY’RE WINDOW HER TO They're lying to her 
A BUG DECEPTIVE IT’S PLAN It's a deceptive plan 
DISTRUSTFUL A CAR CHARACTER SHE’S She's a distrustful character 
MESSAGE DOUBTS THE COFFEE HE He doubts the message 
DISGUISE THEY BOTTLE IN APPEAR They appear in disguise 
VERY SMELLED COOKING IT FISHY  It smelled very fishy 
 
Trust Condition  
Interspersed with neutral sentences. 
 
Scrambled Sentence Solution 
RELIABLY CAR STARTS THE BALCONY The car starts reliably 
ALWAYS CHERRY HONESTY BEST IS Honesty is always best 
DOCUMENT THE AUTHENTIC IS SING  The document is authentic 
INTEGRITY WITH BEHAVED MARMELADE THEY  They behaved with integrity 
REWARDED TRUST BOOTH WAS HER Her trust was rewarded 
UPRIGHT AN HE’S GLASS CITIZEN He's an upright citizen 
UNANIMOUS WAS DEER VOTE THE The vote was unanimous 
HER HE SING ON RELIES He relies on her 
SPOTLESS CHARACTER RUNNING IS HIS His character is spotless 
STORY HER BELIEVABLE APPLE WAS  Her story was believable 
RIVER INNOCENT THEIR WAS BEHAVIOR Their behavior was innocent 
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IN CUP HE HER CONFIDES  He confides in her 
PROMISE THE LION KEPT WAS The promise was kept 
UNDENIABLE AN GUITAR IT’S FACT It's an undeniable fact 
STATEMENT ACCURATE WAS CLOUD HIS His statement was accurate 
IS BIKE COMPLETELY SHE TRUSTWORTHY She is completely trustworthy 
APPEARS PATH THE RAINCOAT CERTAIN The path appears certain 
THEM BELIEVES MORNING SHE IN She believes in them 
ARGUMENT BULLETPROOF A IT’S LAKE It's a bulletproof argument 
DEPENDABLE IS SHE LAMP VERY She is very dependable 
FRIENDS THEY CUSHION LOYAL ARE They are loyal friends 
FAITHFUL PANTS HE’S HUSBAND A He's a faithful husband 
TOLD SHE THE BUG TRUTH She told the truth 
A HE FEATHER TEAMPLAYER IS He is a teamplayer 
 
Control Sentences (All Studies) 
Interspersed with trust and distrust sentences. 
 
Scrambled Sentence Solution 
WATERS BEEN PLANTS SHE THE She waters the plants 
DRINK COLOURS ARE THREE THERE  There are three colours 
WAS YESTERDAY DOOR RAINING IT It was raining yesterday 
THEY HANDLE COFFEE THEIR DRINK  They drink their coffee 
CAR RAVEN DROVE HE HIS  He drove his car 
OFF TURN DISTRIBUTE OFF THE Turn off the light 
PASS CLOUDS BACKWARDS BY THE  The clouds pass by 
COOKIES HAT SOME THEY BAKE  They bake some cookies 
IT THE SUNNY TODAY IS  It is sunny today 
HAVE IS THE ROUND TABLE  The table is round 
FRESH THERE QUICKLY BEANS ARE There are fresh beans 
NOW IS WINTER CLICK IS  Now it is winter 
PRODUCTS BRUSHES HAIR SHE HER She brushes her hair 
DOG WALKS CORN HE HIS He walks his dog 
THERE WANT MORE WERE FIVE There were five more 
THE BLOWING POPCORN IS WIND The wind is blowing 
THEY WALKING HER ORANGE SAW They saw her walking 
ARE HONEY LEAVES THE FALLING The leaves are falling 
SINGING HE ALONG IS SAUSAGE He is singing along 
CHOCOLATE LIKE THEY COOK EATING They like eating chocolate 
IS GRASS THE BUTTER GROWING  The grass is growing 
IS BURNING CANDLE THE STONE The candle is burning 
FIDDLE SEAT PLAYED SHE THE She played the fiddle 
WATER BOOK THEY THE READ They read the book 
 
  
DISTRUST AND MORAL JUDGMENT  57 
  
Additional Control Sentences (Study 2 neutral condition) 
Replaced trust and distrust sentences in Study 2 control condition. 
 
Scrambled Sentence Solution 
COZY BLANKET IS TABLE THE The blanket is cozy 
THOUGHT AN MONDAY THAT’S INTERESTING  That's an interesting thought 
WOOD IS CARVES THE SHE She carves the wood 
THE LOOKS ALWAYS BIG TOWER  The tower looks big 
WHEN USEFUL VERY IS ELECTRICITY Electricity is very useful 
EARLY MEETING SUITCASE STARTED THE The meeting started early 
DISHWASHER THE RUNNING MOUNTAIN WAS The dishwasher was running 
BOUGHT SHE A MILK CD She bought a CD 
HOMEWORK LIGHTBULB HE HIS BEGAN He began his homework 
DOES HERE HE LAUNDY THE He does the laundry 
LIPSTICK ANOTHER SHE APPLIES HER  She applies her lipstick 
IS THE DRYING PAINTING PRODUCTS The painting is drying 
HAY PHONE HORSE THE ATE The horse ate hay 
PENCIL A VISITS HE MUSEUM  He visits a museum 
SOCCER NOW PLAY GREY THEY They play soccer now 
APPLE CHAIR ROCKED HIS HE  He rocked his chair 
TULIPS BOX THE YELLOW ARE The tulips are yellow 
WEARS SHIRT SCREEN A HE He wears a shirt 
HANDLE PLUS TURNED THEY THE  They turned the handle 
TOMATOES FURRY SALE ON ARE Tomatoes are on sale 
WRITE THEIR PAPERS THEY PURSE They write their papers 
BIKE HE THE SPOKE RIDES He rides the bike 
BOTTLED OLD SEEMS RUG THE The rug seems old 
HE BOX SENDING THE EMPTIES He empties the box 
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Figure Captions  
 
Figure 1.  
Processing tree illustrating the underlying components leading to judgments that harmful 
action is either acceptable or unacceptable in congruent and incongruent moral dilemmas.  
 
Figure 2.  
Mean standardized PD utilitarianism and deontology scores in the trust and distrust mindset 
conditions, Study 1. Error bars depict standard errors. 
 
Figure 3.  
Mean standardized PD utilitarianism and deontology scores in the trust, neutral, and distrust 
mindset conditions, Study 2. Error bars depict standard errors. 
 
Figure 4.  
Mean standardized PD utilitarianism and deontology scores in the trust and distrust mindset 
conditions, Study 3. Error bars depict standard errors. 
 
Figure 5.  
Feeling torn between the response options for incongruent dilemmas mediated the effect of 
distrust mindset on the deontological parameter, controlling for the utilitarian parameter, 
Study 3. Feeling torn between the options for congruent dilemmas also simultaneously 
mediated this effect, but in the opposite direction. Unbracketed values reflect unstandardized 
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coefficients; bracketed values reflect standard errors. † p = .062, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, 
*** = p < .001.  
 
Figure 6.  
Feeling torn between the response options for incongruent dilemmas mediated the effect of 
distrust mindset on the utilitarian parameter, controlling for the deontology parameter, Study 
3. Feeling torn between the options for congruent dilemmas also simultaneously mediated 
this effect, but in the opposite direction. Unbracketed values reflect unstandardized 
coefficients; bracketed values reflect standard errors. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < 
.001. 
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Table 1.  
Correlations between Conventional Relative Utilitarian versus Deontological Judgments, the 
Deontology and Utilitarianism Process Dissociation Parameters, and Gender, All Studies.  
 
 
Relative 
Utilitarian 
versus 
Deontological 
Judgments 
Utilitarian PD 
Parameter 
Deontology PD 
Parameter 
Study 1    
Utilitarian PD Parameter  .49***   
Deontology PD Parameter -.69*** .22*  
Gender (m = 1, f = 2) -.21† -.04 .18 
Study 2    
Utilitarian PD Parameter  .48***   
Deontology PD Parameter -.74*** .18*  
Gender (m = 1, f = 2) -.30*** -.01 .36*** 
Study 3    
Utilitarian PD Parameter  .38***   
Deontology PD Parameter -.64*** .38***  
Gender (m = 1, f = 2) -.26** -.02 .22* 
Note: † p = .06, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
